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Abstract It may be difficult to motivate politicians in their last term. To solve this problem,
we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets, flexible pensions,
and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the potential reelection
chances of the politician. Pensions depend on the price in the information market and thereby
motivate the politician to act in a socially optimal manner. We show that, on balance, the
triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the
manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of flexible pensions.
Keywords Elections · Flexible pensions · Democracy · Information markets · Triple
mechanism
JEL Classification D72 · D82
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the last-period problem in connection with politicians, i.e., the
problem of motivating an officeholder to work hard for the benefit of the public if he knows
that it is his final term in office. Such incumbents may be tempted to shy away from working
hard on socially desirable public projects.
We suggest a new mechanism for dealing with the problem of a lack of disciplining de-
vices during this last term in office. The idea is to combine information markets and the
politician’s pension scheme. Our proposal can be outlined as follows: Suppose an office-
holder learns that he would not like to run for reelection. This information is private. The
politician has to decide how much effort he is still willing to expend on current policy
projects. The effort choice is not verifiable. The public does not know whether or not the
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politician wants to run again, so it organizes an information market predicting the chances
of the incumbent being reelected. A high price on the information market indicates a high
probability that the incumbent will be reelected.1 At some point in time, the incumbent
announces whether he will seek a further term or not. In the former case, the information
market is concluded when the next election has taken place. In the latter case, the infor-
mation market is neutralized, i.e., the investors simply get their money back. The last price
realized, however, is used in this case to determine the pension of the retiring incumbent.
A higher price, and thus higher assessment of the incumbent’s reelection chances, yields a
higher pension.
Such a scheme involves two effects. On the one hand, the politician can increase his pen-
sion by increasing his efforts. On the other, flexible pensions decrease the marginal value
of getting reelected as the gap between remuneration in office and the pension decreases
with higher effort. The purpose of the paper is first to illustrate the idea in a simple polit-
ical agency model and second to show that a carefully designed combination of political
information markets and flexible pensions can—on balance—improve welfare.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss the related literature.
We introduce the basic model in Section 3. The results with fixed pensions are analyzed in
Section 4. In Section 5 we introduce flexible pensions. Section 6 contains our main results.
In Section 7 we discuss some issues concerning the practical implementation of flexible
pensions for politicians. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature about pensions for politicians and about the incentive
problem in an incumbent’s last term.2 The problem that the reelection mechanism can no
longer motivate the incumbent when he knows that the term in question is his final one is
described, e.g., in Barro (1973) and Carey (1994).3 Barro (1973) suggests solving the last-
period problem in the following way: Political parties might provide a control mechanism
for ex-officeholders based on their performance during their last term in office by appointing
them to special positions in the party, such as honorary chairman.4 Another solution to the
last-period problem has been suggested by Becker and Stigler (1974). They suggest that
officeholders should be threatened with the loss of their pension in the case of malfeasance
during their last term. Our solution to the last-term problem is to introduce an information
market and design a flexible pension scheme depending on the resulting market price.5
1Alternatively, one might use an information market that predicts the percentage rate of votes the incumbent’s
party will receive, or even directly the shares of votes the incumbent party will be given. Such variations would
not change the basic idea behind our proposal.
2The fact that the incumbent may not exert high effort during his last term is one form of political shirking
which is defined as a legislator not acting in the interest of the public. A review of the literature on political
shirking can be found e.g., in Bender and Lott (1996).
3Note that there may also be positive last-term effects as the probability that the incumbent undertakes long-
term efficient policies that are unpopular in the short term may be higher when the politician knows that
he is in his last term. The question of whether the overall effects of last terms are positive or negative is
controversial in the literature (see for example Smart and Sturm 2004).
4We note that officeholders performing well may have better career opportunities after they leave office than
worse performing ones, which alleviates the last-term problem.
5In this paper we concentrate on the case of politicians voluntarily retiring from their political career or losing
in the reelection decision. We neglect the case where politicians have to leave office due to term limits. We
will discuss how the last-term problem might be solved in the case of term limits in Sect. 8.
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Another paper proposing a solution to the last-term problem in politics is Alesina and
Spear (1988). In an overlapping generations model, they analyze a scenario where politi-
cians have to choose a platform in a one-dimensional policy space. Without a reward, an
incumbent will select his most preferred policy in his last term, which may deviate from
one that is socially optimal. They suggest a solution where the current incumbent receives
a transfer from his own party’s next candidate for office if he does not choose his own bliss
point, but a policy which increases this candidate’s election chances. There are four differ-
ences between Alesina and Spear (1988) and the solution developed in our paper. First, the
Alesina and Spear approach is based on the belief that a promise to reward incumbents for
good performance today will be honored by the same reward scheme in the future. In our
case, the reward for good performance is solely determined by the performance of the in-
cumbent and does not depend on what will happen in the future. Second, the Alesina and
Spear approach exhibits multiplicity of equilibria. In one equilibrium, the last period prob-
lem is not solved. We have a unique equilibrium. Third, we introduce an information market,
which produces a verifiable outcome of the efforts of the politician. Such a mechanism is
missing in Alesina and Spear. Fourth, our approach requires implementation through public
pension laws, while the Alesina and Spear solution can work through conventions.
Our proposal for flexible pensions is related to the proposal to combine contracts and de-
mocratic elections introduced by Gersbach (2003, 2004), and extended by Gersbach and
Liessem (2008). These papers show how the dual mechanism—incentive elements and
elections—can improve political outcomes. All these papers rely on verifiable data by which
contracts can be conditioned. In this paper, we analyze the case where the results from cur-
rent policy can only be observed, but are never verifiable. Accordingly, a political informa-
tion market is used to produce verifiable information in the form of prices at a time when
policy results are not observable.
There is extensive literature on incentive contracts in general. The analysis of incentive
problems in the classical principal-agent framework started with Mirrlees (1976), Holm-
ström (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983). One can distinguish incentive schemes based
on objective performance measurement (see e.g., Baker 1992 and Lazear 2000) and incen-
tive mechanisms based on subjective performance assessments (see e.g., Gibbons 1998). We
are using an objective performance measure, as we make payment dependent on the price
on the information market in this paper.6
Political information markets have attracted much attention recently. Information mar-
kets have been suggested to improve public policy decisions (see e.g., the recent surveys
and discussions by Hahn and Tetlock (2004), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), or by Hanson
(2003), who suggests using information markets to select policies expected to raise GDP).
The basic idea behind information markets is the accumulation of scattered information to
predict uncertain future events. Political information markets have turned out to be very suc-
cessful in predicting election results (see e.g., Berg et al. 1996 or Berlemann and Schmidt
2001). We use information markets to estimate the performance on which politicians’ pen-
sions depend. In a companion paper, Gersbach and Müller (2006) show that a combination
of democratic elections, informations markets, and reelection threshold contracts can be
used to motivate politicians to undertake efficient long-term policies in cases where their
performance is not verifiable.
6Of course, the price on the information market is generated on the basis of subjective assessments by in-
vestors.
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3 The basic model
We consider a political agency problem with asymmetric information regarding the incum-
bent’s decision about running for reelection. There are two periods denoted by t = 1,2. The
public consists of a large number of homogeneous voters. A representative voter is denoted
by v.
3.1 The effort decision
We assume that there is one risk-neutral incumbent in office who has to decide the level of
effort to spend on a task creating a public project in period 1. The chosen amount of effort in
period 1 is denoted by e. We assume that due to physical constraints there is an upper bound
e > 0 such that 0 ≤ e ≤ e. We use b to denote the social benefits per capita deriving from
the expenditure of effort and assume that they are proportional to the amount of effort, i.e.,
b = k · e (1)
with 0 < k < 1. On the other hand exerting effort is costly for a politician. Effort e in period 1
is associated with costs ce2 for the incumbent. The factor c (where c > 0) can be interpreted
as the competence of the incumbent. A small value for c is equivalent to high competence,
i.e., undertaking a given project does not result in high effort costs for the politician. We will
use the standard rule to break ties. If the incumbent is indifferent as to two effort options, he
will choose the amount of effort that leads to higher social welfare.
3.2 The utility
We use Wt to denote the utility from holding office in period t . The variable m denotes the
level of the pension the politician will receive in period 2 if period 1 is his last term in office.
We start with a fixed pension scheme where pensions are fixed to m and m > 0.
At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent observes the utility he would derive from
holding office in the next period. This can either be low utility W 2 or high utility W 2. The
a priori probability that the incumbent will obtain W 2 in the next period is q (where 0 <
q < 1), while the probability of obtaining W 2 is 1 − q . We assume that q is common knowl-
edge. There are a variety of reasons why W2 may be stochastic. For instance, an incumbent
may be physically exhausted so that staying in office would be a risk to his health. Also,
challengers in his own party may threaten to make life in office difficult for the politician.
Finally, the incumbent may forgo other career opportunities if he stays in office.
The incumbent will run for reelection if and only if his utility from holding office in
the next period is at least as large as his outside option, which consists of his pension. We
assume that W 2 ≥ m and that W 2 < m. Thus, at the end of period 1 the incumbent will
run for reelection if he observes W 2, while he will not want to run for reelection if he
observes W 2.
We assume that—just like every other citizen—the politician receives per capita benefits
b = ke. We use r1 to denote the incumbent’s probability of getting reelected at the end of
period 1 and δ to denote his discount factor (0 < δ < 1). As W1 (i.e., the utility from holding
office in period 1) is sunk when the politician chooses his amount of effort, we will neglect
W1 in the subsequent analysis. The remaining utility of incumbent i is denoted by Ui . After
he has learned W2, Ui is either
UiNR = ke − ce2 + δm (2)
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if he knows that he will not run for reelection (W2 = W 2) or
UiR = ke − ce2 + δ[(1 − r1)m + r1W 2] (3)
in the case where he knows that he will run for reelection (W2 = W 2).
It is obvious that the incumbent will never choose e = 0, as he benefits from the public
project. Finally, we make the following assumption:
e ≥ k
2c
+
√
δW 2
c
. (4)
This assumption ensures that the incumbent will never want to choose a corner solution.7
Accordingly, we can concentrate on interior solutions.
The expected utility function of a representative voter v is:8
Uv = b. (5)
3.3 The information structure
We assume that at the beginning of period 1 the incumbent knows whether he will run for
reelection at the end of this period or whether this will be his final term in office. However, he
will not yet disclose this to the public in order to avoid a loss of political power (in particular
in his own party). In politics, an incumbent who is known not to be seeking reelection but
continuing to hold office up to the election date is called a lame duck.9 In extreme cases
incumbents known to be lame ducks are unable to implement any more projects during the
remainder of their final term.
We assume that voters are able to perfectly observe the value of b at the date of the
reelection decision and can thus perfectly infer e. We assume that, in contrast to ordinary
voters, investors receive early signals about the performance of the politician.10 In particular,
each investor j obtains a noisy signal βj before the incumbent informs the public about
whether he will run for reelection or not. We assume that signal βj is given as
βj = b + εj , (6)
where the error term εj is a random variable with support [−a;a] (a > 0), distributed with
the density function f (ε) and E(ε) = 0. Thus the signal β is distributed with the density
function f (β) = f (b + ε) on [b − a;b + a] and E(β) = b.11
7This is shown in Appendix B.
8Note that we disregard the wage and pension costs of the politician in the utility function of the voters, which
is a good approximation if the number of voters is large.
9The “lame duck” phenomenon is well documented in the literature (see e.g., Millimet et al. 2004).
10One could assume that investors spend time on collecting information concerning the quality of the incum-
bent’s policy and thus obtain such knowledge earlier than ordinary voters.
11Note that any signal βj < 0 will be interpreted as b = 0 and that any signal βj > ke will be interpreted as
b = ke.
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3.4 The reelection scheme
In modeling reelections, we have to look only at the case where the incumbent runs for office
again. Voters are assumed to make their reelection decisions dependent on expected benefit
and thus on the effort the politician has exerted. From the perspective of the incumbent at
the beginning of period 1, the probability r1 that the politician will be reelected when he
runs for reelection and voters observe effort e is assumed to be given by
r1(e) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if e = 0,
φe if 0 < e < e,
1 if e = e,
(7)
where φ = 1
e
> 0. Note that the incumbent will never get reelected if he exerts no effort at
all and that he will get reelected with certainty only if he chooses the maximum possible
amount of effort.
The fact that reelection probability depends monotonically on e can be interpreted as a
mixture of prospective and retrospective voting behavior (see Gersbach and Liessem 2008
for detailed justification and discussion). The essential assumption is that the reelection
scheme is a continuous function of effort.
3.5 Summary
The timing of the game is summarized in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Timeline with fixed pensions
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4 Results under fixed pensions
In this section we assume that the amount of the pension is fixed at m. Recall that we assume
that m ≤ W 2, as otherwise incumbents would never aspire to get reelected.
4.1 First-best solution
We start by characterizing the first-best solution. To derive the first-best solution we assume
that the public observes the realization of W2 and can write a forcing contract contingent
on W2 and on the effort level. If the incumbent fulfills the contract, he will be reappointed
(in case W2 = W 2) or he receives the fixed pension m (in case W2 = W 2). There are no
elections. We denote the first-best amount of effort by efix,FBR if W 2, and by e
fix,FB
NR if W 2.
Proposition 1 The first-best amount of effort is given by
e
fix,FB
R =
k
2c
+
√
δW 2
c
, (8)
e
fix,FB
NR =
k
2c
+
√
δm
c
. (9)
The proof is given in the Appendix. First-best efforts are given straightforwardly by the
maximum effort at which the politician is indifferent between exerting first-best effort and
renouncing the contract. Note that the first-best solution is achieved e.g., by the following
punishment scheme:
• If the incumbent wants to stay in office and chooses a lower level of effort than efix,FBR ,
then he will not be re-appointed.
• If the incumbent wants to retire and chooses a lower level of effort than efix,FBNR , then he
will receive no pension.
Such harsh punishment would require that the public was able to observe W2, which,
however, is private information in our model. In the following, we assume that voting is
given by (7), which we discussed in Sect. 3.4.12
4.2 Fixed pensions and the reelection mechanism
In this subsection we derive subgame-perfect equilibria for the game in the case where
reelection takes place or the politician opts for a fixed pension scheme.
As the politician knows whether he will run for reelection or not at the date when he
chooses his amount of effort, two incentive constraints are important: ICfixR when the politi-
cian runs for reelection and ICfixNR when he does not.
The incentive constraints are given as follows:
ICfixR e = arg max
e
{ke − ce2 + δ[r1W 2 + (1 − r1)m]}, (10)
ICfixNR e = arg max
e
{ke − ce2 + δm}. (11)
12We would like to stress that a purely retrospective voting scheme, i.e., a threshold voting scheme, would
also be an equilibrium response of voters in our model.
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We start with the case where the politician does not run for reelection.
Proposition 2 In the case where the politician knows that he will not run for reelection, his
effort choice is
e
fix
NR =
k
2c
. (12)
Similarly, we obtain
Proposition 3 In the case where the politician knows that he will run for reelection, his
effort choice under the reelection scheme r1 is
e
fix
R =
k + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c
. (13)
The incumbent’s effort choice under the reelection mechanism is lower than in the first-
best solution for two reasons. If the politician does not want to run for reelection, fixed
pensions do not create incentives to work hard and the effort choice is determined solely by
personal benefits. If the politician runs for reelection, he has a chance of staying in office by
exerting less effort than in the first-best solution, which in turn induces him to do so.
Corollary 1
(i) efixNR < efix,FBNR .
(ii) efixR < efix,FBR .
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix.
5 The model with flexible pensions
In the following, we introduce information markets and flexible pensions to investigate
whether such a scheme can improve welfare.
5.1 The information market
We introduce a political information market that is organized in the first period, after the
incumbent has chosen his amount of effort, but before he announces whether he will run for
reelection.13 We assume that there is an uneven number N of potential investors and that
each investor is allowed to trade only up to s assets.14 We assume that s is not too large,
so that no investor is liquidity-constrained. Investors are assumed to be a small group of the
13Note that at this point of time, there will usually be uncertainty about the opponent in the reelection race.
Then participants in the information market will evaluate the reelection chances of the incumbent against
an unknown opponent. Such markets are already used in practice, e.g., there is a market which predicts the
chances of a candidate for becoming President of the United States versus an unknown opponent.
14It makes sense to restrict trade in such information markets to individuals and to limit trading volume per
person to avoid large-scale manipulation attempts.
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electorate, so they have no influence on the voting outcome. Investors are assumed to be
risk-neutral and have the following utility:
Uj(Yj ) = Yj , (14)
where Yj is gain or loss in the information market.15 Investor j obtains a signal βj and uses
this signal to assess whether the politician is likely to get reelected or not.
There are two assets D and E. If the politician is successfully reelected, then the owners
of asset D receive one monetary unit per unit of D. If the politician stands for reelection but
is not reelected, then the owners of asset E receive one monetary unit per unit of E. If the
politician does not run for reelection, the market will be neutralized, i.e., each investor will
be paid back the money he has invested.16 The entire information market works as follows:
A bank or an issuer offers an equal amount of assets D and E. On the secondary market,
traders can buy assets D or E.17 Trading in the secondary market results in a price p for
one unit of asset D. As buying one unit of D and one unit of E pays one monetary unit
with certainty, no arbitrage implies that the price of asset E must be 1 −p. Otherwise either
traders or the issuer could make riskless profits. An equilibrium in the information market
is a price p∗ such that traders demand an equal amount of assets D and E.
If the incumbent runs for reelection but loses to the rival candidate, his pension may
be based either on the price in the information market or on the election result. When the
information market works perfectly and correctly predicts the result of the next election,
both measures are identical, and we will use the market price as a reference base for the
determination of the pension, including the case where an incumbent loses.
It is useful to look more closely at the event tree associated with the assets. If, for exam-
ple, an investor buys one unit of asset D at price p, then the event tree, the payoffs on the
information market, and the pension of the incumbent are given in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 Event tree
15Note that we neglect the utility from the chosen effort of the politician in the utility function of the investors,
as policy outcomes have no influence on the trading behavior of the investors.
16Note that the politician may use his information about the fact whether he will run for reelection to make
riskless profits in the information market. At the moment, we assume that politicians are not allowed to trade
in the information market to solve this problem. In the extensions, we will offer alternative solutions.
17We could allow for short-selling, but this is immaterial to our analysis.
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5.2 Flexible pensions
Our central assumption is that the level of pension m depends positively on price p on
the information market predicting the probability that the incumbent will be reelected. The
basic idea is the following: If the incumbent has performed well during his last term and
his reelection chances are high, price p will be high, and this will yield a larger pension.
Through price p the pension will depend on the effort exerted by the politician. We maintain
our assumption that the incumbent will run for reelection if and only if he observes W 2 to
be his utility from office in period 2. The formal version of the necessary conditions for this
assumption will be given in the next section.
5.3 Summary
The timing of the whole game, including information markets and flexible pensions, is sum-
marized in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 Timeline with flexible pensions
6 Results under flexible pensions
In this section we derive the main results when flexible pensions are used.
6.1 Pricing on the information market
In the first step we determine the equilibrium price in the information market. An investor j
with signal βj takes into account his own information and the information the market price
reveals. A standard way of modeling the information aggregation process is as follows:
Prj (RE|p) = z Prj (RE|βj ) + (1 − z)p. (15)
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Prj (RE|p) is the probability assessment of investor j on the chances that the incumbent
will be reelected, where z (with 0 ≤ z ≤ 1) is a weighting term describing self-assessed
confidence, i.e., the subjective confidence of an investor in his own signal βj relative to the
market belief expressed by price p.18 We assume that z is the same across all investors.
We next derive the investor’s reelection assessment for the incumbent. As e = b
k
and
r1(e) = φe and taking into account the boundary conditions, we obtain
Prj (RE|βj ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if φ
k
βj < 0,
φ
k
βj if 0 ≤ φk βj ≤ 1,
1 if φ
k
βj > 1.
(16)
Given price p and belief βj , an investor j maximizes
max
dj
EUj = (1 − q)[Prj (RE|p) (dj (1 − p)) + (1 − Prj (RE|p)) (−djp)] + q · 0, (17)
where −s ≤ dj ≤ s. If dj is positive, investor j wants to buy dj units of asset D. If dj is
negative, investor j wants to buy dj units of asset E. We obtain
∂EUj
∂dj
= (1 − q)[(zPrj (RE|βj ) + (1 − z)p)(1 − p) − (1 − zPrj (RE|βj ) − (1 − z)p)p].
The derivative of the expected utility regarding dj does not depend on dj , so each investor
will choose a corner solution. If his signal βj is larger than the median signal, which is
denoted by βmj , then he will buy the largest possible amount of assets D, i.e., dj = s. If
his signal βj is smaller than βmj , then he will buy the largest possible amount of assets E,
i.e., dj = −s. As all investors will buy the largest allowed amount of assets, the number of
investors who want to buy assets D is equal, in equilibrium, to the amount of investors who
want to buy assets E. Accordingly we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4
(i) There is a unique equilibrium in the information market given by
p∗ = φβ
m
j
k
. (18)
(ii) The expected price p∗E is given by
p∗E = e
e
. (19)
The proof is given in the Appendix. The expected price p∗E is given by the ratio of the
effort e that the incumbent actually exerts and the maximum effort level e. Note that 0 ≤
p∗E ≤ 1 and that the expected equilibrium price depends positively on e. If the incumbent
chooses more effort e, the expected signal E[βm] will increase, which in turn raises p∗E .
This property will be used to design a flexible pension scheme in the next subsection.
18For a statistical foundation see Morris (1983) and Rosenblueth and Ordaz (1992). This information aggre-
gation procedure is also used in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) and Gersbach and Müller (2006).
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6.2 Linear dependence of pension and effort
We next introduce flexible pensions in the form of a two-part scheme:
m = m0 + αp∗. (20)
Thus, the pension scheme is composed of a constant part m0 where 0 ≤ m0 ≤ m, and of a
flexible part that depends in a linear way on the price in the information market with α > 0.
The expected pension mE for the politician depends on the expected equilibrium price and
is thus given by
mE = m0 + αp∗E. (21)
We construct the pension scheme in such a way that the expected flexible part of the
pension that is paid in the case of the highest possible effort is equal to m. This requires
α
e
e
= m (22)
which yields α = m and
mE = m0 + me
e
. (23)
We define λ := m
e
and obtain
mE = m0 + λe. (24)
Finally, using e = 1
φ
leads to
λ = φm. (25)
To ensure that the incumbent will run for reelection if and only if he observes W 2, we
sharpen our technical assumptions concerning W 2 and W 2. We assume that W 2 ≥ m + m0,
which ensures that 0 ≤ mE(e) ≤ W 2 for all feasible values of e. Furthermore, we assume
that W 2 < 0.
We again have to distinguish two cases. Either the politician decides that he will run for
reelection (ICflexR ) or he decides to drop out (ICflexNR ). The optimum effort choices in both cases
follow from the incentive constraints:
ICflexR e = arg max
e
{ke − ce2 + δ[r1W 2 + (1 − r1)mE(p(e))]}, (26)
ICflexNR e = arg max
e
{ke − ce2 + δmE(p(e))}. (27)
We start with the latter case and obtain
Proposition 5 When the politician knows that he will not run for reelection, he chooses
e
flex
NR =
k + δλ
2c
. (28)
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the Appendix. The former case yields
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Proposition 6 In the case where the politician knows that he will run for reelection, his
effort choice under a system with flexible pensions will be the following:
e
flex
R =
k + δλ + δφ(W 2 − m0)
2c + 2δφλ . (29)
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the Appendix. It follows immediately from Propo-
sition 6 that the amount of effort is decreasing in m0, which is the fixed part. The intuition for
this result is as follows: The disciplining effect of the reelection mechanism becomes weaker
when the gap between the pension and W 2 becomes smaller. As the spread decreases with
m0, the result follows.
6.3 Welfare effects
In the following, we analyze two polar cases in order to shed light on the welfare effects
of flexible pensions. The pure flexible pensions system is m0 = 0. This represents a scheme
where the incumbent receives no pension when he exerts no effort and where the highest
possible pension for him is equal to m. Hence, in comparison to the system with fixed
pensions, this is a pure penalty system. The other polar case is m0 = m, which represents
a pure bonus system where the incumbent is never worse off in comparison to the fixed
pension scheme.
We compare the pure penalty and the pure bonus system with fixed pensions and start
with the case where the incumbent is not running for reelection:
Proposition 7 If the incumbent is not running for reelection, then the amount of effort under
flexible pensions is strictly larger than it is under fixed pensions for any m0 where 0 ≤
m0 ≤ m.
This result follows directly from Propositions 2 and 5. This result is intuitively clear.
Under a scheme with fixed pensions, the only motive to exert effort for an incumbent who
knows that he will not run for reelection is private utility from policy projects. Under the
two-part pension scheme, a higher effort choice increases his pension, and the politician
has larger benefits from exerting effort, which in turn increases public welfare. Note that
Proposition 7 holds for all types of two-part flexible pension schemes.
Now we look at the case where the politician knows that he will run for reelection. Here
it will be important to distinguish pure penalty and pure bonus systems. We start with the
former.
Proposition 8 If the incumbent runs for reelection and if m0 = 0, then the amount of effort
under flexible pensions will always be weakly larger than it is under fixed pensions.
Propositions 7 and 8 imply that a pure penalty pension scheme is weakly welfare-
improving in all cases. However, pure penalty schemes are difficult to use in practice. Hence
we next consider a pure bonus system.
Proposition 9 If the incumbent runs for reelection and if m0 = m, then the level of effort
under flexible pensions will be smaller than the level of effort under fixed pensions if and
only if
W 2 − m > c − kφ
δφ2
. (30)
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Thus flexible pensions are not always welfare-enhancing if m0 = m. The intuition for the
result that flexible pensions may decrease welfare is as follows: On the one hand, a system
with flexible pensions motivates the incumbent ceteris paribus to choose a higher amount of
effort, as this increases his pension in the case where he loses the reelection. On the other,
flexible pensions result ceteris paribus in a lower effort choice by the incumbent, as the
disciplining effect of the reelection mechanism becomes weaker when the gap between the
pension and W 2 narrows. If the latter effect is larger, then flexible pensions under a pure
bonus system will result in a lower effort choice than fixed pensions. It is obvious that the
latter effect is growing in m0, and this explains our result that the positive welfare effects
of flexible pensions are decreasing in m0. As we see in condition (30) flexible pensions will
tend towards being worse than fixed pensions if the gap between W 2 and m is large, which
means that the motivation due to the reelection mechanism is substantial.
Finally, we determine the scheme of flexible pensions with the highest value of m0 that
is universally welfare-enhancing, i.e., we determine a critical value, denoted by mcrit, such
that flexible pensions are always welfare-improving for all m0 < mcrit. We obtain
Proposition 10 There exists a mcrit > 0 such that for all m0 ≤ mcrit flexible pensions are
weakly welfare-increasing in comparison to fixed pensions. This critical value is given by
mcrit = 2m − kλ + δφλ(W 2 − m)
c
. (31)
The proof of Proposition 10 is given in the Appendix. Proposition 10 shows that a pension
scheme using m0 < mcrit is always weakly welfare-increasing.
7 Practical considerations
In this section we will address several issues concerning the practical implementation of our
proposal.
7.1 Choice between fixed and flexible pensions
It is conceivable that an incumbent is not planning to run for reelection, and would like
to make unpopular decisions which he perceives to be desirable in the long-term. Flexible
pensions might deter an incumbent from undertaking such long-term projects. This problem
might be solved as follows: Already at the beginning of his term, the incumbent has the
opportunity to announce that this will be his final term in office. If he does so, then he
receives a fixed pension. Otherwise he will be subject to the flexible pension scheme. Thus,
the incumbent can choose between early and late announcement, linked to the corresponding
pension scheme.19
7.2 Preventing manipulations by the incumbent
As mentioned above, the incumbent may have incentives to manipulate the information mar-
ket in the following way: Suppose he knows that he will not run for reelection. Then he has
an incentive to buy large amounts of assets D in order to trigger a higher equilibrium price,
19An analysis of such schemes is left to future research.
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as this would raise his pension. As the politician knows that the information market will be
neutralized and that amounts invested will be paid back, the gains in terms of pensions are
riskless. This is a serious concern.
The most obvious way to prevent this is to prohibit trading by politicians and to punish the
use of stooges. However, such prohibitions may be not sufficient to prevent manipulations.
In the following, we briefly discuss two possibilities to ensure that the incumbent is not
interested in manipulating the market.
First, one should use an average price calculated over a long time-span to determine the
incumbent’s pension. This is possible, since a flexible pension scheme will be applied only
when the announcement not to run for reelection occurs late in the term, e.g., two or three
years after the term has started. Hence, there is a time span of two or three years for which
the average price in the information market can be used to determine the pension. If an
average price is used to determine the pension, an incumbent who wants to raise his pension
would be forced to manipulate the price in the information market every day, which would
become very costly over time.
Second, one could renounce neutralization when the incumbent is not running for reelec-
tion. If investors receive nothing if an incumbent does not run for reelection,20 the incumbent
has no incentive to manipulate the market in the way described above. With such a scheme
of non-neutralization, prices pD and pE for assets D and E will be lower,21 as investors
have to take into account the case where they lose their invested money if the incumbent
is not running for reelection. In such cases, one uses the ratio pD
pE
for the variable part of a
flexible pension scheme.
Renouncing neutralization makes manipulations by the incumbent extremely costly and
will deter him from such activities, as long as the trading volume on the market is sufficiently
large. The intuition runs as follows: Suppose the incumbent wants to boost the equilibrium
market price from p∗ to a higher price, say p+. Then he must pay 2s times the number of
investors who receive signals that suggest a reelection probability in the interval [p∗, p+] in
the equilibrium without manipulation.22 If there are many investors, manipulations to induce
a large difference p+ − p∗ will become very costly, as all money spent for additional assets
D is lost for the incumbent.
The best possible way is to combine average prices and non-neutralization to deter in-
cumbents from manipulating the information market.
7.3 Term limits
As already mentioned, our proposal cannot be applied when there are term limits, since the
information market will not work if it is certain that the incumbent is in his last term. In this
case, one may conceive other ways to make pensions dependent on performance in the last
term. For instance, one could make the pension depend on the vote-share the incumbent’s
party will receive in the next election. As long as voters punish or reward parties for the
behavior of their past officeholders,23 such a scheme would have effects similar to the ones
20One might assume that the money is used as revenues for the government, e.g., it might be used to finance
the pensions of politicians.
21Note that pD and pE will no longer add to 1.
22The reason is as follows: Investors in the interval [p∗, p+] originally buy assets D, but if the price is
boosted to p+, they switch and buy assets E. Thus, to induce an equilibrium price p+ , the incumbent has to
buy an amount of assets D equal to the excess demand of assets E by private investors.
23Empirical evidence for a positive link between economic performance and election prospects for the in-
cumbent party has been provided e.g., by Fair (1996) and Hibbs (2000).
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of flexible pension schemes. Making pensions dependent on the future vote-share of the
ruling party would be applicable even in the case of binding term limits.
7.4 Balanced budgets
A useful extension is to explore budget-neutral design of flexible pensions, i.e., to impose the
requirement that expected expenditures are equal under flexible and under fixed pensions.
One might argue that the public does not want to spend more on flexible pensions than on
fixed ones. We start by explicitly introducing the salary of politicians in office, denoted by
S, which is assumed to be fixed. Total benefits W2 are then composed of S and a personal,
non-monetary benefit from holding office, denoted by P2. P2 is either P 2 < 0 or P 2 > 0,
such that W 2 = S +P 2 and W 2 = S +P 2 are the two possible realizations of utilities of the
incumbent. We use rfix1 and r
flex
1 to denote reelection probability depending on the pension
scheme. The flexible pension scheme is given by m = m0 + μe, where m0 and μ (with
μ > 0) are treated as variables selected by the public. The public’s problem is given by:24
max
m0,μ
qe
flex
NR + (1 − q)eflexR (32)
subject to
q(m0 +μeflexNR )+ (1−q)[rflex1 S + (1− rflex1 )(m0 +μeflexR )] = qm+ (1−q)[rfix1 S + (1− rfix1 )m],
e
flex
NR =
k + δμ
2c
,
e
flex
R =
k + δμ + δφ(P 2 + S − m0)
2c + 2δφμ ,
r
fix
1 = φ
k + δφ(P 2 + S − m)
2c
and
r
flex
1 = φ
k + δμ + δφ(P 2 + S − m0)
2c + 2δφμ .
Note that the public aims at maximizing the expected effort under the flexible pension
scheme, subject to the requirement that the expected remuneration of the politician is the
same under flexible and under fixed pensions. The optimization problem yields a unique
solution involving m0 = 0. The solution for μ is straightforward, but tedious to calculate
and therefore omitted.
7.5 Outside influences
In practice, the reelection probability of the incumbent will not only depend on his amount
of effort, as there are many other influences beyond the incumbent’s control. However, as
long as the incumbent can affect his reelection chances by working harder, our solution can
work. Moreover, the use of a longer time-span to calculate the average price for determining
the pension diminishes the impact of a single factor outside the control of officeholders.
24We focus on parameter constellations where interior solutions hold.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we have suggested a new procedure for solving the motivation problem of a
politician in his last term. Several useful extensions of our model might be pursued in fu-
ture research. For example, the model could be enriched by considering a heterogeneous
electorate and interest groups lobbying for particular policies. Such an extension might
strengthen the value of our mechanism, as politicians are less vulnerable to outside influ-
ence when their pensions are at stake. Moreover, we have suggested a mechanism mitigat-
ing the motivation problem of an incumbent knowing he is in his final term, but having the
same interests in policies as voters. Of course, incentive schemes may backfire as they may
have unintended consequences. Which types of unintended consequences of flexible pension
schemes exist and how they can be remedied is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The public maximizes its utility subject to the incumbent still want-
ing to enter into the contract. If the incumbent does not enter into the contract and will nei-
ther receive a pension nor be reelected after completion of his current term, then he would
maximize ke − ce2, which yields e = k2c . In this case his utility is equal to k
2
4c .
If W2 = W 2 and the incumbent wants to stay in office, the problem of the public is given
by
maxUv = b, (33)
s.t. δW 2 + ke − ce2 ≥ k
2
4c
. (34)
As ∂b
∂e
> 0, condition (34) will hold with equality, which yields
e1/2 = k2c ±
√
δW 2
c
. (35)
Hence the public will demand the highest possible amount of effort
e
fix,FB
R =
k
2c
+
√
δW 2
c
. (36)
The proof in the case where the incumbent does not want to run for reelection is analogous
and is therefore omitted here. 
Proof of Proposition 2 The incumbent has the following utility function:
U
fix
NR = ke − ce2 + δm. (37)
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The first-order condition ∂U
fix
NR
∂e
= k − 2ce = 0 implies efixNR = k2c . According to our assump-
tions, we have k2c ≤ e, so the solution is feasible. Note that the incumbent will never choose
e = 0, as his utility would be equal to δm, which is smaller than U fixNR( k2c ) = k
2
4c + δm. 
Proof of Proposition 3 The incumbent has the following utility function:
U
fix
R = ke − ce2 + δ[r1W 2 + (1 − r1)m]. (38)
The first-order condition amounts to
∂U
fix
R
∂e
= k − 2ce + δ ∂r1
∂e
W 2 − δ ∂r1
∂e
m = 0. (39)
Using ∂r1
∂e
= φ, we obtain
k − 2ce + δφ(W 2 − m) = 0 (40)
which yields efixR = k+δφ(W2−m)2c . Note that efixR > 0 since W 2 ≥ m. Furthermore, we have
U
fix
R (
k+δφ(W2−m)
2c ) = [k+δφ(W2−m)]
2
4c + δm > δm = U fixR (0). Thus the politician will always pre-
fer efixR over e = 0. Finally, according to our assumptions we have efixR ≤ e. 
Proof of Corollary 1 We have efixNR = k2c < k2c +
√
δm
c
= efix,FBNR in the case where the politician
is not running for reelection.
In the case where the politician is running for reelection, we have to show that
e
fix,FB
R > e
fix
R . This condition is equivalent to
k
2c
+
√
δW 2
c
>
k + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c
. (41)
By using φ = 1
e
, condition (41) can be transformed into 4ce2W 2 > δ(W 2 − m)2. Using our
assumption e ≥ k2c +
√
δW2
c
, the condition becomes
k2
δc
W 2 + 4k
δ
√
δW 2
c
W 2 + 2W 2m + 3W 22 − m2 > 0, (42)
which is fulfilled since W 2 ≥ m. 
Proof of Proposition 4 Part (i). The necessary condition for an equilibrium in the informa-
tion market is that the number of investors with
(1 − q)[s(1 − p)(zPrj (RE|βj ) + (1 − z)p) − sp(1 − zPrj (RE|βj ) − (1 − z)p)] > 0
be equal to the number of investors with
(1 − q)[s(1 − p)(zPrj (RE|βj ) + (1 − z)p) − sp(1 − zPrj (RE|βj ) − (1 − z)p)] < 0.
This condition will be fulfilled if the investor who obtains the median signal βmj is indif-
ferent as to buying assets D or E and thus if
(1 − q)[(1 − p)(zPrj (RE|βmj ) + (1 − z)p) − p(1 − zPrj (RE|βmj ) − (1 − z)p)] = 0.
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Inserting φ
k
βmj for Prj (RE|βmj ) and solving for p∗ yields equation (18).
Part (ii). The expected value for βmj is equal to E[β] as the signals βj are assumed to
be distributed symmetrically around E[β]. Further, we know that E[β] = b = ke. Thus we
obtain the expected value for the equilibrium price by inserting ke for βmj in equation (18).
Moreover, we use 1
e
for φ and obtain equation (19). 
Proof of Proposition 5 The incumbent has the following utility function:
U
flex
NR = ke − ce2 + δmE(e). (43)
The first-order condition ∂U
flex
NR
∂e
= k − 2ce + δλ = 0 implies eflexNR = k+δλ2c . According to our
assumptions, eflexNR ≤ e, so the solution is feasible for the incumbent. 
Proof of Proposition 6 The incumbent maximizes
U
flex
R = ke − ce2 + δ[r1(e)W 2 + (1 − r1(e))mE(e)]. (44)
We insert m0 +λe for mE(e) and φe for r1(e) and obtain the following first-order condition:
∂U
flex
R
∂e
= k − 2ce + δφ(W 2 − m0) + δλ − 2δφλe = 0. (45)
Solving for e yields eflexR = k+δλ+δφ(W2−m
0)
2c+2δφλ . According to our assumptions, e
flex
R ≤ e, so the
solution is feasible for the incumbent. 
Proof of Proposition 8 For m0 = 0 we obtain eflex,m0=0R = k+δλ+δφW22c+2δφλ when the incumbent
runs for reelection. We prove eflex,m
0=0
R ≥ efixRR by contradiction. Suppose eflex,m
0=0
R < e
fix
R ,
which implies
k + δλ + δφW 2
2c + 2δφλ <
k + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c
. (46)
By using λ = φm, this condition can be simplified to
W 2 > m + 2c − kφ
δφ2
. (47)
By inserting W 2 > m + 2c−kφδφ2 into eflex,m
0=0
R , we obtain
e
flex,m0=0
R =
k + δλ + δφW 2
2c + 2δφλ >
k + δλ + δφ(m + 2c−kφ
δφ2
)
2c + 2δφλ . (48)
Furthermore, we can show that
k + δλ + δφ(m + 2c−kφ
δφ2
)
2c + 2δφλ =
1
φ
= e. (49)
Thus we have eflex,m
0=0
R > e which is a contradiction as the effort choice under flexible
pensions would be too large to be feasible. Hence eflex,m
0=0
R ≥ efixR . 
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Proof of Proposition 9 For m0 = m we obtain eflex,m0=mR = k+δλ+δφ(W2−m)2c+2δφλ in the case where
the incumbent runs for reelection. The level of effort under flexible pensions will be smaller
than the level of effort under fixed pensions if eflex,m
0=m
R < e
fix
R . This condition
k + δλ + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c + 2δφλ <
k + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c
(50)
can be simplified to
W 2 > m + c − kφ
δφ2
. (51)
We next show that the effort under flexible pensions may be indeed lower than under
fixed pensions. This is the case if the set of parameters {c, k, δ, e,m,W 2} simultaneously
fulfills condition (51) and the condition
e
flex,m0=m
R =
k + δλ + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c + 2δφλ ≤ e. (52)
Let us choose
W 2 = m + c − kφ
δφ2
+ ε (53)
for some ε > 0. Then the second condition translates into
k + δφ(m + c−kφ
δφ2
+ ε − m) + δλ
2c + 2δφλ ≤ e, (54)
which (by inserting 1
e
for φ and m
e
for λ) can be transformed into
c
δ
e2 + m ≥ ε. (55)
Equation (55) will be fulfilled for small values of ε. Thus we have shown that the effort
under flexible pensions may be lower than under fixed pensions. 
Proof of Proposition 10 We calculate mcrit such that eflexR = efixR . This condition
k + δλ + δφ(W 2 − m0)
2c + 2δφλ =
k + δφ(W 2 − m)
2c
(56)
can be simplified to
m0 = m − kλ + δφλ(W 2 − m)
c
+ λ
φ
. (57)
By inserting m for λ
φ
, we obtain the critical value mcrit. It is obvious that mcrit > 0, as we
have shown in Proposition 8 that for m0 = 0 flexible pensions are always weakly welfare-
increasing. 
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Appendix B: Corner solutions
In this Appendix we prove that our assumption
e ≥ k
2c
+
√
δW 2
c
= efix,FBR
is sufficient to ensure interior solutions in all cases by showing that under this assumption
all interior solutions are smaller than the physical constraint e.
The highest possible effort choices with interior solutions are given by
• Fixed pensions: efix,FBR = k2c +
√
δW 2
c
.
• Flexible pensions with m0 = 0: eflex,m0=0R = k+δλ+δφW22c+2δφλ .
As our assumption is equivalent to e ≥ efix,FBR , it remains to be shown that e ≥ efix,FBR implies
e ≥ eflex,m0=0R . By using φ = 1e and λ = me , the condition e ≥ eflex,m
0=0
R can be transformed
into
e ≥ k +
√
k2 + 8cδ(W 2 − m)
4c
.
It is straightforward to verify that k2c +
√
δW 2
c
is larger than k+
√
k2+8cδ(W2−m)
4c . Thus e ≥
k
2c +
√
δW2
c
implies e ≥ k+
√
k2+8cδ(W2−m)
4c , which proves our claim.
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